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1 Introduction
The availability of credit and how credit varies over the business cycle has been a subject
of keen interest, especially in the wake of the ﬁnancial crisis. Some cyclical variation in
total lending is to be expected, even in a frictionless world where the conditions of the
Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem hold. There are more positive net present value
(NPV) projects that need funding when the economy is strong than when the economy
is weak. Therefore, we should expect total credit to increase during the up-swing and
decline in the down-swing. The debate about procyclicality of the ﬁnancial system is
therefore more subtle. The question is whether the ﬂuctuations in lending are larger than
would be justiﬁed by changes in the incidence of positive NPV projects.
We examine the evidence on the procyclicality of lending and explore a possible mi-
crofoundation for the observed ﬂuctuations in the availability of credit over the business
cycle. Our focus is on the way that credit supply ﬂuctuates as a consequence of how ﬁ-
nancial intermediaries manage their leverage in reaction to changing economic conditions.
Elsewhere (Adrian and Shin (2010)), we documented that the leverage of market-based
ﬁnancial intermediaries was procyclical - that is, leverage is high during booms and low
during busts. Procyclicality of leverage is the mirror image of increased collateral require-
ments (increased “haircuts”) during downturns, and Geanakoplos (2009) and Gorton and
Metrick (2012) have examined how the risk bearing capacity of the ﬁnancial system can
be severely diminished when leverage falls through an increase in collateral requirements.
Here, we make two contributions. First, we delve deeper into the reasons for the
procyclicality of leverage and document the important explanatory role played by mea-
sured risks through the ﬁrms’ disclosed Value-at-Risk. Value-at-Risk (VaR) is a quantile
measure on the loss distribution deﬁned as the smallest threshold loss O such that the
probability that the realized loss turns out to be larger than O is below some ﬁxed proba-
bility . If a bank were to manage its risk by maintaining Value-at-Risk to be no larger
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than its equity capital, the bank would ensure that it remains solvent with probability at
least 1. We ﬁnd that the unit Value-at-Risk, deﬁned as the Value-at-Risk per dollar
of assets, ﬂuctuates widely over the ﬁnancial cycle in step with measures of risk such as
the implied volatility of options on the banks’ traded shares. However, in contrast to
the wide ﬂuctuations in the risk environment through the VaR to asset ratio, there are
much more modest ﬂuctuations in the ﬁrms’ VaR to equity ratio. The digerence is ac-
counted for by the active management of leverage by intermediaries, especially the active
shedding of risks through deleveraging during times of market stress. Indeed, we show
that the evidence is consistent with the rule of thumb that Value-at-Risk normalized by
equity is kept constant over the cycle, even at the height of the crisis. The implication is
that intermediaries are shedding risks and withdrawing credit precisely when the ﬁnancial
system is under most stress, thereby serving to amplify the downturn.
Our second contribution is theoretical. Based on the evidence, we explore the extent
to which a standard contracting model can provide the microfoundations for procyclical
leverage driven by Value-at-Risk. In order to keep our framework as close as possible
to the existing corporate ﬁnance literature, we explore perhaps the simplest possible
contracting model where a bank seeks funding from its creditors which it can channel to
its customers.
We ﬁnd that under fairly general conditions on the outcome distribution given by
Extreme Value Theory (EVT), a standard contracting framework with risk-shifting moral
hazard can generate an exact Value-at-Risk rule, where ﬁnancial intermediaries keep their
book equity matched with their Value-at-Risk at some given conﬁdence level. For some
cases, we can solve explicitly for the failure probability  in the VaR rule. In this way, we
are able to endogenize the threshold probability  used in the Value-at-Risk rule. The
statistical foundations underlying EVT provide some reassurance that our results are
applicable to a broad class of problems involving extreme outcomes. Given how widely
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Value-at-Risk is used by ﬁnancial intermediaries, our framework can thereby provide a
bridge between theory and practice.
The implication of our theoretical ﬁnding is that the contracting frictions for ﬁnancial
intermediaries can inject considerable procyclicality into the ﬁnancial system. The out-
come of our contracting problem has the creditors imposing a leverage limit on the bank
that implies a ﬁxed probability of failure of the bank, irrespective of the risk environment.
Since measured risk ﬂuctuates over the cycle, imposing a constant probability of failure
implies very substantial expansions and contractions of the balance sheet of the bank for
any given level of bank equity. In other words, the contract implies substantial leveraging
and deleveraging over the cycle.
Our ﬁndings are signiﬁcant not only for the microfoundations of Value-at-Risk, but
also for the contrast with the implications from models that build on standard portfolio
choice. For instance, log preferences, which are widely used for their tractability in models
of ﬁnancial intermediation and in applications in macroeconomics have the implication
that portfolio leverage increases during busts as investors are attracted by the high risk
premium that is available (see Adrian, Colla and Shin (2012)). Relatedly, we also discuss
the distinction between leverage inherent in the portfolio of the bank (its book leverage)
from the market capitalization and enterprise value of the bank, which focuses on how
much the bank is worth to its claim holders. Our concern is with the lending behavior
of the bank and so our focus is on the total assets of the bank and its book leverage.
In a concluding section, we discuss the points of contact with the literature and high-
light the common threads, including the implications of our results for ﬁnancial stability
analysis and for macro applications. We begin in the next section by reviewing the
evidence on the role of Value-at-Risk as a driver in procyclical leverage of ﬁnancial inter-
mediaries. We then explore the contracting environment and show the key comparative
statics result that leverage ﬂuctuates in response to shifts in underlying risk.
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Figure 1: Three modes of leveraging up. Mode 1 is through an equity buyback through a debt issue.
Mode 2 is through a dividend ﬁnanced by asset sale. Mode 3 is through increased borrowing to fund new
assets. In each case the grey area indicates balance sheet component that is held ﬁxed
2 Value-at-Risk and Leverage
In textbook discussions of corporate ﬁnancing decisions, the set of positive net present
value (NPV) projects is often taken as being given, with the implication that the size
of the balance sheet is ﬁxed. Instead, attention falls on how those assets are ﬁnanced.
Leverage then increases by substituting equity for debt, such as through an equity buy-
back ﬁnanced by a debt issue, as depicted by the left hand panel in Figure 1.
Figure 1 shows two other modes of leveraging up. In each case, the grey shaded area
indicates the balance sheet component that remains ﬁxed. The middle panel depicts the
outcome of a dividend payment funded by the sale of assets, with debt held ﬁxed. The
middle panel is also closest to the way that leverage ﬂuctuates in Merton’s (1974) model
of long term debt where leverage ﬂuctuates due to changes in the value of assets, with
notional debt held ﬁxed.
However, the ﬁrst two panels in Figure 1 turns out not to be a good description of
the way that banking sector leverage varies over the ﬁnancial cycle. For US investment
banks, Adrian and Shin (2010) show that leverage ﬂuctuates through changes in the total
size of the balance sheet, with equity being the exogenous variable. Hence, leverage and
total assets tend to move in lock-step, as in the right hand panel of Figure 1.
Figure 2 is the scatter plot of the quarterly change in total assets of the US broker
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Figure 2: Scatter chart of changes in debt and equity to changes in assets of the US broker dealer sector
(1990Q1 - 2012Q2) (Source: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds)
dealer sector where we plot the changes in assets against equity, as well as changes in
assets against debt.1 More precisely, it plots {({Dw>{Hw)} and {({Dw>{Gw)} where
{Dw is the change in total assets to quarter w, and {Hw and {Gw are the corresponding
changes in equity and debt, respectively. We see from Figure 2 that US broker dealers
conform to the right hand panel (mode 3) of Figure 1 in the way that they manage their
balance sheets. The ﬁtted line through {({Dw>{Gw)} has slope very close to 1, meaning
that the change in assets in any one quarter is almost all accounted for by the change
in debt. The slope of the ﬁtted line through the points {({Dw>{Hw)} is close to zero,
indicating that equity is “sticky”.
2.1 Assets versus Enterprise Value
The equity series in the scatter chart in Figure 2 is of book equity, giving us the digerence
between the value of the bank’s portfolio of claims and its liabilities. An alternative
measure of equity would have been the bank’s market capitalization, which gives the
market price of its traded shares. Note that market capitalization is not the same as
1The slopes of the two ﬁtted lines sum to 1 due to the additivity of covariances in the regression
coecients and the balance sheet identity D = G +H.
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the marked-to-market value of the book equity. For securities ﬁrms that hold primarily
marketable securities and that are ﬁnanced via repurchase agreements, the book equity
of the ﬁrm reﬂects the haircut on the repos, and is fully marked to market.
Market capitalization is the discounted value of the future free cash ﬂows of the secu-
rities ﬁrm, and will depend on cash ﬂows such as fee income that do not depend directly
on the portfolio held by the bank. Focus on market capitalization leads naturally to the
consideration of the enterprise value of the bank, which is deﬁned as
Enterprise value = market capitalization + debt (1)
In this sense, enterprise value is the analogue of the total assets of the bank when market
capitalization is considered as a liability. Enterprise value is about how much the bank
is worth to its claim holders. For investment decisions, corporate takeovers, or the sale
of new ownership stakes, enterprise value is the appropriate value concept.
However, our concern is with the availability of credit through the intermediary, and
hence with the lending decisions of the bank. Thus, the appropriate balance sheet concept
is that of total assets, rather than enterprise value, since total assets address the issue
of how much the bank lends. The corresponding equity concept is book equity, and
the appropriate concept of leverage is the ratio of total assets to book equity. Ideally,
the book value of equity should be marked-to-market, so that market values are used.2
The haircut in a collateralized borrowing arrangement is the best example of book equity
that is fully marked-to-market. But we should remember there may only be a loose
relationship between the market capitalization of a ﬁrm and the marked-to-market value
of the ﬁrm’s book equity, as evidenced by the strong variation of market to book values
over time even for intermediaries that hold marketable securities. The loose relationship
2When assets are illiquid, accounting values may not fully reﬂect market prices. Bischof, Bru¨ggemann
and Daske (2011) discuss one example of illiquid assets giving rise to “stale” book values when fair value
reporting requirements were suspended temporariliy at the height of the crisis.
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is due to the fact explained above that market equity includes the present value of future
cash ﬂows not directly related to the ﬁnancial assets.
Figure 3 presents side by side the scatter charts for the growth of total assets and
enterprise value for the eight largest banks and broker dealers in the US. The group of
eight ﬁrms includes the (formerly) ﬁve largest investment banks (Goldman Sachs, Morgan
Stanley, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and Bear Stearns) and the three commercial
banks with the largest trading operations (JP Morgan Chase, Citibank, and Bank of
America). All eight of these institutions have been primary dealers of the Federal Re-
serve.3 Although the three commercial banks have assets that are not marked to market
(such as loans), they also have substantial holdings of marketable securities.4 The three
commercial bank have absorbed some of the largest formerly independent investment
banks (Citibank acquired Salomon Brothers in 1998, Chase acquired JP Morgan in 2000
and Bear Stearns in 2008, and Bank of America acquired Merrill Lynch in 2008), and
their book equity reﬂects valuation changes, albeit imperfectly. Institutions that we do
not consider in the analysis are the foreign banks, some of which also own substantial
trading operations in the US.
The left hand panel of Figure 3 is the scatter chart for the relationship between
the asset-weighted growth (quarterly log digerence) in book leverage against the asset-
weighted growth in total assets. The right hand panel of Figure 3 is the corresponding
scatter chart where we use enterprise value instead of total assets and use market capi-
talization instead of book equity.
The left hand panel shows the upward-sloping scatter chart associated with procyclical
book leverage as discussed in Adrian and Shin (2010). In contrast, the right hand panel
of Figure 3 shows that when leverage is deﬁned as the ratio of enterprise value to market
3see http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/pridealers current.html
4Ball, Jayaraman and Shivakumar (2012) report the ﬁndings of a detailed investigation of the securities
holdings of commercial banks, and ﬁnd that banks with larger holding of trading securities are associated
with share prices with larger bid-ask spreads.
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Figure 3: The left panel shows the scatter chart of the asset-weighted growth in book leverage and
total assets for the eight largest US broker dealers and banks. The right panel is the scatter for the
asset-weighted growth in enterprise value leverage and enterprise value. Enterprise value is the sum of
market capitalization and debt, and enterprise value leverage is the ratio of enterprise value to market
capitalization. The dark dots are for 2007 - 2009. The eight instutions are Bank of America, Citibank, JP
Morgan, Bear Stearns, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley (Source:
SEC 10Q ﬁlings) .
cap, the scatter chart is negatively sloped, so that leverage is high when enterprise value
is low. In other words, enterprise value leverage is countercyclical. The interpretation
is that during downturns when the value of the bank is low, a greater proportion of the
bank’s value is held by the creditors, rather than the equity holders. The procyclical and
countercyclical leverage plots of Figure 3 are consistent with the ﬁnding of Ang, Gorovyy
and van Inwegen (2011), who document the countercyclical nature of hedge fund leverage
when leverage is computed using market values, consistent with the right plot of Figure 3
Which of the two notion of leverage is relevant depends on the context and the question
being addressed. Enterprise value has to do with how much the bank is worth. Assets
have to do with how much the bank lends. Regulators and policy makers whose primary
concern is with the availability of credit will give weight to the book values for this reason.
In our paper, the focus is on the lending decision by banks. Hence, our focus will also
be on the total assets of the bank and its book leverage. From now on, when we refer to
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“leverage”, we mean book leverage, deﬁned as the ratio to total assets to book equity.
2.2 Determinants of Leverage
Our modeling approach is motivated by the patterns observed in Figure 2, and we are
interested in the determinants of the bank’s leverage. For intermediaries that hold traded
securities, we are asking what determines the haircut on the ﬁrm’s collateralized borrow-
ing. We investigate how the notion of Value-at-Risk can help to explain banks’ behavior.
For a bank whose assets today are D0, suppose that its total assets next period is
given by a random variable D. Then, its Value-at-Risk (VaR) represents the “approxi-
mate worse case loss” in the sense that the probability that the loss is larger than this
approximate worst case loss is less than some small, pre-determined level. Formally,
the bank’s Value-at-Risk at conﬁdence level f relative to some base level D0 is smallest
non-negative number Y such that
Prob (D ? D0  Y )  1 f (2)
Banks and other ﬁnancial ﬁrms report their Value-at-Risk numbers routinely as part of
their ﬁnancial reporting in their annual reports and as part of their regulatory disclosures.
In particular, disclosures on the 10K and 10Q regulatory ﬁlings to the US Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) are available in electronic format from Bloomberg, and we
begin with some initial exploration of the data. We begin by summarizing some salient
features of the VaR disclosed by the major commercial and investment banks.5
Figure 4 plots the asset-weighted average of the 99% VaR of the eight institutions,
obtained from Bloomberg.6 The VaRs are reported at either the 95% or 99% level,
depending on the ﬁrm. For those ﬁrms for which the 95% conﬁdence level is reported,
we scale the VaR to the 99% level using the Gaussian assumption. We superimpose on
5Bank of America, Citibank, JP Morgan, Bear Stearns, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill
Lynch and Morgan Stanley.
6The Bloomberg code is ARDR TOTAL VALUE AT RISK.
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Figure 4: Risk Measures. The ﬁgure plots the unit VaR and the implied volatility for the eight large
commercial and investment banks. Both variables are standardized relative to the pre-crisis mean and
standard deviation. The measures are the lagged weighted averages of the standardized variables across
the eight banks, where the weights are lagged total assets. Unit VaR is the ratio of total VaR to total
assets. Implied volatilities are from Bloomberg. The grey shaded area indicates ±2 standard deviations
around zero.
the chart the unit VaR (deﬁned as the VaR per dollar of assets) and the equity implied
volatility. Both are measures of ﬁrm risk. While the unit VaR is the ﬁrms’ own assessment
of risk, the implied volatility is the market’s assesement of equity risk. The vertical scaling
is in units of the pre-2007 standard deviations, expressed as deviations from the pre-2007
mean.
Figure 4 shows how the unit VaR compares to the implied volatility of the equity option
prices as an alternative risk measure. Between 2001 and the beginning of 2007, the risk
measures were stable and moved within a tight band around their mean. However, with
the onset of the crisis, both measures spiked. The unit VaR increased over ﬁve standard
deviations relative to their pre crisis levels. The run-up in implied volatility was even
more dramatic at nearly twenty standard deviations relative to the pre crisis level. These
series reﬂect the general mayhem in the markets at the time of the crisis. For our exercise,
we can interpret the unit VaR series as reﬂecting the risk environment of the recent past
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Figure 5: Risk and Balance Sheet Adjustment. This ﬁgure plots the unit VaR together with the
intermediary balance sheet adjustment variables VaR/Equity and Leverage. All variables are standardized
relative to the pre-crisis mean and standard deviation. The measures are the value weighted averages of
the standardized variables across the eight banks, where the weights are lagged total assets. Unit VaR is
the ratio of total VaR to total assets. VaR/Equity is the ratio of total VaR to total book equity. Leverage
is the ratio of total assets to total book equity. The grey shaded area indicates ±2 standard deviations
around zero.
which the ﬁrms take into account when they make decisions on how much risk exposure
to take on. Notice the time lag (at around six months) in the spiking of the Unit VaR
series relative to the implied volatility series. Whereas the implied volatility series spike
in December 2008, the Unit VaR series peaks in June 2009. The lag can be attributed to
the backward-looking nature of the VaR estimates, which are based on a window of past
data.
Value-at-Risk turns out to be informative in explaining the way that ﬁrms manage
their balance sheets. Consider the so-called Value-at-Risk (VaR) rule, which stipulates
that the ﬁnancial intermediary maintains enough equity H to cover its Value-at-Risk. The
VaR rule can be stated equivalently as maintaining enough equity H so that the bank’s
probability of failure is kept constant, set to the conﬁdence threshold associated with the
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VaR measure used by the bank. When VaR is given by Y , the rule can be written as
H = Y (3)
so that the ratio of VaR to equity stays constant. The idea is that the ﬁrm can cut
back its asset exposure when the environment becomes more risky thereby bringing its
Value-at-Risk back in line with this equity. Figure 5 is revealing in this respect. It plots
the following three series:
• unit VaR
• the ratio of VaR to Equity
• leverage (the ratio of total assets to equity)
In other words, Figure 5 plots the leverage series together with the VaR normalized
by book equity. It shows that the ﬁrms reacted to the spike in measured risks by
sharply reducing their leverage. While the average leverage across the banks increased
slightly until the Bear Stearns crisis in March 2008, it dropped by more than ﬁve standard
deviations between the second and the fourth quarters of 2008. At the same time, the
VaR to equity ratio barely changed. Thus, even as the unit VaR was ﬂuctuating sharply,
the VaR to equity ratio was moving much less, giving weight to the Value-at-Risk rule as
a good approximation of the way that the ﬁrms were managing their risks. The evidence
is that the banks in our sample were shedding risk exposures very sharply over the crisis
period.
The analysis based on normalized time plots in Figures 4—5 is further conﬁrmed by the
correlation analysis of quarterly growth rates in Table 1. We see that leverage growth
is strongly negatively correlated with shocks to the risk measures (unit VaR growth,
and lagged implied volatility changes), but uncorrelated with the growth of the VaR to
equity ratio. The evidence is that leveraged ﬁnancial intermediaries manage their balance
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Table 1: Correlations of weighted average series. Each variable is the average weighted by lagged total
assets across banks. The * denotes signiﬁcance at the 10 percent level, The ** denotes signiﬁcance at the
5 percent level, the *** denotes signiﬁcance at the 1 percent level.
Quarterly Leverage Growth
Quarterly VaR/E growth 0.03
Quarterly Unit VaR growth -0.33WW
Quarterly CDS spread change -0.52WW
Quarterly implied volatility changes (lagged) -0.31WW
sheets actively so as to maintain Value-at-Risk equal to their equity in the face of rapidly
changing market conditions.
Evidence at the individual ﬁrm level can be obtained through panel regressions. Table
2 presents evidence from the panel regressions for the ﬁve Wall Street investment banks,
although the panel is unbalanced due to the failure of Bear Stearns in March 2008, Lehman
Brothers in September 2008 and the merger of Merrill Lynch with Bank of America in
2008. The regressions examine the implication of the Value-at-Risk rule where leverage
O satisﬁes O = D@H = 1@y so that
lnO =  ln y (4)
where y is unit VaR (Value-at-Risk per dollar of assets). When log leverage is regressed
on the log of the unit VaR, the VaR rule would predict that the coecient is negative
and equal to 1.
In Table 2, the ﬁrst column reports the simple OLS regression for the pooled sample.
Columns 2 to 4 are ﬁxed egects panel regressions, where columns 3 and 4 use clustered
standard errors at the bank level. Column 5 uses the GEE (generalized estimation equa-
tion) method7 for averaged egects across banks described in Hardin and Hilbe (2003). The
GEE method attempts to estimate the average response over the population (“population-
averaged” egects) when the error structure is not known. The parantheses report either
7http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Generalized estimating equation
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Table 2: Panel regressions for leverage. This table reports regressions for the determinant of leverage
of the ﬁve US broker dealers. The dependent variable is log leverage. Column 1 is the OLS regression
for the pooled sample. Columns 2 to 4 are ﬁxed eects panel regressions. 3 and 4 use clustered standard
errors at the bank level. Column 5 uses the GEE (generalized estimation equation) method for averaged
eects across banks (Hardin and Hilbe (2003)). t statistics are in parantheses in columns 1 to 4. Column
5 reports z scores.
Dependent variable: log leverage (w or } stat in parantheses)
1 2 3 4 5
log unit VaR -0.479*** -0.384*** -0.384** -0.421** -0.426***
(-11.08) (-9.2) (-2.17) (-2.99) (-3.12)
implied vol 0.002 0.002
(0.85) (0.87)
constant -1.089 -0.247 -0.247 -0.630 -0.689
(-2.82) (-0.66) (-0.16) (-0.53) (-0.59)
U2 0.40 0.32 0.32 0.34
obs 185 185 185 185 185
I or "2 122.7 84.6 4.71 115.7 337.8
est. method OLS FE FE FE GEE
clust. err N Y Y Y
*** and ** indicate signiﬁcance at 1% and 5% levels, respectively
the w statistic (for columns 1 - 4) or the }-score (column 5).
We see that the coecient on log unit VaR is negative and signiﬁcantly digerent from
zero throughout, although they fall short of the predicted magnitude of 1. Translated
in terms of risk premiums, leverage is high in boom times when the risk premium (unit
VaR) is low. For macro applications that are concerned with lending decisions by the
bank or for the applications to runs on banks and other ﬁnancial intermediaries as in
Geanakoplos (2009) and Gorton and Metrick (2012), the procyclical nature of leverage
plays an important role in the analysis.
A further consequence of the VaR rule can be derived from equation (4) which implies
that
lnOw  lnOw31 =  (ln yw  ln yw31) (5)
so that the scatter chart of leverage changes against unit VaR changes should have slope
1. Figure 6 plots log changes in leverage against log changes in Unit VaR. We can see
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Figure 6: Shocks to Risk and Adjustments to Leverage. This ﬁgure plots the annual growth rate
in Unit VaR against the annual growth rate in Leverage. The variables are weighted by lagged total
assets. The diagonal line has slope 1. The red dots correspond to the quarters during the ﬁnancial
crisis.
two distinct regimes in the ﬁgure. During the ﬁnancial crisis from the third quarter of
2007 through the fourth quarter of 2009, the slope of the scatter is close to 1, although
we do not fully capture the feature that the intercept should be zero. Bearing in mind
that these are annual growth rates, we can see from the horizontal scale of Figure 6 that
the deleveraging was very substantial, indicating large balance sheet contractions.
Our ﬁndings point to the VaR rule being an important benchmark to consider in
how leverage is chosen by the ﬁnancial intermediaries in our sample, at least as a ﬁrst
hypothesis. We now turn to a possible theoretical rationale for the VaR rule based on a
standard contracting framework.
3 Contracting Framework
Having conﬁrmed the promising nature of the Value-at-Risk rule as a rule of thumb for
bank behavior, we turn our attention to providing possible microfoundations for such
a rule. Our approach is guided by the need to select the simplest possible framework
that could rationalize the behavior of the intermediaries in our sample, relying only on
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standard building blocks. There should be no presumption that the approach developed
below is the only such microfoundation. However, the spirit of the exercise is to start
from very familiar building blocks, and see how far standard arguments based on these
building blocks will yield observed behavior.
Our approach is to consider the contracting problem between an intermediary and
uninsured wholesale creditors to the intermediary. We may think of the intermediary
as a Wall Street investment bank and the creditor as another ﬁnancial institution that
lends to the investment bank on a collateralized basis. We build on the Holmstro¨m
and Tirole (1997) model of moral hazard but focus attention on the risk choice by the
borrower. We do not address why the contract takes the form of debt, and rely on other
formulations that argue for the optimality of debt (such as Innes (1990), Gale and Hellwig
(1985) or DeMarzo and Due (1999)). Instead, our focus is on the limits on leverage as
the constraint placed by the (uninsured) wholesale creditor on the intermediary, thereby
limiting the size of balance sheet for any given level of capital of the borrower.8
With the application to credit availability in mind, we will formulate the framework
so that we can examine shifts in the payog parameters that mimic the shifts in economic
conditions over the business cycle. This entails examining a family of payog distributions
that are indexed by a parameter  that indicates the stage of the business cycle. High
 corresponds to boom times, while low  corresponds to busts. Our interest is on how
the leverage implied by the contracting outcome depends on .
We ﬁnd that under quite general conditions on the payog distribution that are ap-
propriate for extreme outcomes (such as the failure of ﬁnancial intermediaries), we ﬁnd
that the probability of default of the ﬁnancial intermediary is invariant to shifts in . In
8This is a theme that is well-known in the banking literature on minimum capital requirements that
counteract the moral hazard created by deposit insurance (Michael Koehn and Anthony Santomero
(1980), Daesik Kim and Santomero (1988), Jean-Charles Rochet (1992)). Gabriella Chiesa (2001),
Guillaume Plantin and Rochet (2006) and Vittoria Cerasi and Rochet (2007) have further developed the
arguments for regulatory capital not only in banking sector, but in the insurance sector as well.
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other words, the borrower (the bank) is induced to shrink or expand the balance sheet
as part of the solution so that its failure probability is constant, irrespective of the risk
environment. In short, we ﬁnd that the contracting outcome is that predicted by the
Value-at-Risk rule.
In some special cases, we can even solve explicitly for the ﬁxed probability of default
in the Value-at-Risk rule as a function of the underlying parameters of the contracting
problem. In this way, we provide a microfoundations of the behavior inherent in the VaR
rule from a standard contracting problem.
It is worth reiterating that there should be no presumption that the microfoundation
ogered here is the only way to rationalize the Value-at-Risk rule. Nevertheless, we can
take some comfort in the familiarity of the framework that yields the main result. We re-
gard this result as being potentially an important step in understanding the procyclicality
of the ﬁnancial system. When the economic environment is benign, the intermediary will
expand its balance sheet in accordance with its target probability of default. But when
overall risk in the ﬁnancial system increases, the intermediary cuts its asset exposure in
order to maintain the same probability of default.
3.1 Set up
We now describe the contracting model in more detail. There is one principal and
one agent. Both the principal and agent are risk-neutral. The agent is a ﬁnancial
intermediary that ﬁnances its operation through collaterateralized borrowing. For ease of
reference, we will simply refer to the agent as the “bank”. The principal is an (uninsured)
wholesale creditor to the bank. A bank is both a lender and a borrower, but it is the
bank’s status as the borrower that will be important here.
There are two dates–date 0 and date 1. The bank lends by purchasing assets at
date 0 and receives its payogs and repays its creditors at date 1. The bank starts with
ﬁxed equity H, and chooses the size of its balance sheet. We justify this assumption by
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reference to the scatter chart encountered already in Figures 2 and 3. Denote by D the
market value of assets of the bank. The notional value of the assets is (1 + u¯)D, so that
each dollar’s worth of assets acquired at date 0 promises to repay 1 + u¯ dollars at date 1.
The assets are funded in a collateralized borrowing arrangement, such as a repurchase
agreement. The bank sells the assets worth D for price G at date 0, and agrees to
repurchase the assets at date 1 for price G¯. Thus, the digerence G¯ G represents the
promised interest payment to the lender and (G¯@G)  1 can be interpreted as the repo
interest rate. Equity ﬁnancing meets the gap D G between assets acquired and debt
ﬁnancing. Let H be the value of equity ﬁnancing. The balance sheet in market values
at date 0 is therefore
Assets Liabilities
Assets D Debt G
Equity H
(6)
The notional value of the securities is (1 + u¯)D, and the notional value of debt is the
repurchase price G¯. Thus, the balance sheet in notional values can be written as
Assets Liabilities
Assets D (1 + u¯) Debt G¯
Equity H¯
(7)
where H¯ is the notional value of equity that sets the two sides of the balance sheet equal.
The bank has the choice between two types of assets–good securities and substandard
securities. For each dollar invested at date 0, the bank can buy notional value of 1+ u¯ of
either security. However, for each dollar invested at date 0 the good security has expected
payog
1 + uK
with outcome density iK (=). The bad security has expected payog 1 + uO with density
19
iO (=). We assume that
uO ? 0 ? uK (8)
so that investment in the bad security is inecient. We assume that the bank’s balance
sheet is scalable in the sense that asset payogs satisfy constant returns to scale.
Although the bad securities have a lower expected payog, it has higher upside risk
relative to the good project in the following sense. Denote by IK (=) the cumulative
distribution function associated with iK and let IO (=) be the cdf associated with iO. We
suppose that IK cuts IO precisely once from below so that the distribution functions IO
and IK when adjusted for the mean can be ordered in the sense of second order stochastic
dominance (SOSD). Formally, there is }W such that IK (}W) = IO (}W), and
(IK (}) IO (})) (}  }
W)  0 (9)
for all }. The bank’s initial endowment is its equity H. The bank decides on the total
size of its balance sheet by taking on debt. The debt ﬁnancing decision involves both
the face value of debt G¯ and its market value G. The optimal contract maximizes the
bank’s expected payog by choice of D, G and G¯ with H being the exogenous variable.
The fact that H is the exogenous variable in our contracting setting goes to the heart of
the procyclicality of lending and is where our paper deviates from previous studies. Here,
our starting point is the evidence from the scatter charts (Figures 2 and 3) suggesting that
intermediaries’ equity is sticky even during boom times when leverage is expanding. The
reasons for the stickiness of equity is beyond the scope of our investigation here, although
it is closely related to the “slow-moving” nature of capital as discussed by Due (2010)
in his 2009 AFA Presidential address.9
9The classic papers of Myers and Majluf (1984) and Jensen (1985) discuss some of the frictions that
result in slow-moving capital. See also He and Krishnamurthy (2013) and Acharya, Shin and Yorulmazer
(2013).
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Figure 7: Net payos of the bank (equity holder) and the creditor to the bank (debt holder). G¯ G is
the interest payment received by the creditor
3.2 Contracting Outcome
As noted by Merton (1974), the value of a defaultable debt claim with face value G¯ is
the price of a portfolio consisting of (i) cash of G¯ and (ii) short position in a put option
on the assets of the borrower with strike price G¯. The net payog of the creditor to the
bank is illustrated in Figure 7. The creditor loses her entire stake G if the realized asset
value of the bank’s assets is zero. However, if the realized asset value of the bank is G¯ or
higher, the creditor is fully repaid. We have G¯ A G, since the positive payog when the
bank does not default should compensate for the possibility that the creditor will lose in
the case of default.
The borrower (i.e. the bank) is the residual claim holder, and its payog is illustrated
as the kinked convex function in Figure 7. The sum of the equity holder’s payog and the
creditor’s payog gives the payog from the total assets of the bank.
The solution of the contracting problem involves both the face value of debt G¯ as
well as the market value of debt G. The face value of debt has the interpretation of the
strike price of the embedded option in the debt contract, and enters into the incentive
compatibility constraint for the borrower (the bank), since the incentive constraint must
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limit the option value of limited liability. For the lender, the interest payment is given by
G¯ G, and so the participation constraint involves limiting the size of this gap. Given
G¯, the participation constraint determines G.
Finally, once G is known, the scale of the investment given by D can be determined
from the balance sheet identity D = G +H and the exogenous H.
3.3 Creditor’s Participation Constraint
Denote by K
¡
G¯> D
¢
the price of the put option with strike price G¯ on the portfolio
of good securities whose current value is D. We assume that the market for assets is
competitive, so that the option price satisﬁes constant returns to scale:
K
¡
G¯>D
¢
= DK
³
G¯
D > 1
´
(10)
Similarly, O
¡
G¯>D
¢
= DO
³
G¯
D > 1
´
, for portfolios consisting of bad securities. Deﬁne g¯
as the ratio of the promised repurchase price at date 1 to the market value of assets of
the bank at date 0
g¯  G¯@D (11)
Hence g¯ is the ratio of the notional value of debt to the market value of assets. Deﬁne:
K
¡
g¯
¢
 K
¡
g¯> 1
¢
so that K
¡
g¯
¢
is the price of the put option on one dollar’s worth of the bank’s asset
with strike price g¯ when the bank’s portfolio consists of good assets. O
¡
g¯
¢
is deﬁned
analogously for portfolio of bad securities.
The creditor’s initial investment is G, while the expected value of the creditor’s claim
is the portfolio consisting of (i) cash of G¯ and (ii) short position in put option on the
assets of the bank with strike price G¯. The (gross) expected payog of the creditor when
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the bank’s assets are good is therefore
G¯ DK
¡
g¯
¢
= D
¡
g¯ K
¡
g¯
¢¢
Since the creditor’s initial stake is G, her net expected payog is
XF (D) = G¯ G DK
¡
g¯
¢
(12)
= D
¡
g¯ g K
¡
g¯
¢¢
where g  G@D is the ratio of the market value of debt to the market value of assets. The
participation constraint for the creditor requires that the expected payog is large enough
to recoup the initial investment G. That is,
g¯ g K
¡
g¯
¢
 0. (IR)
The term g¯g is the promised interest payment to the creditor, so that the participation
constraint stipulates that the interest payment should be suciently large to cover the
value of the put option that the creditor is granting to the borrower.
3.4 Bank’s Incentive Compatibility Constraint
The payog of the borrower is given by the digerence between the net payogs for the bank’s
assets as a whole and the creditor’s net payog, given by XF in (12). Thus, the bank’s
payog is
XH (D) = D
¡
u 
¡
g¯ g
¢
+ 
¡
g¯
¢¢
where u 5 {uO> uK}, and 
¡
g¯
¢
5
©

¡
g¯
¢
O
> 
¡
g¯
¢
K
ª
. The bank’s payog consists of the
asset payog u, the value of the option 
¡
g¯
¢
minus the promised interest payment g¯ g.
The optimal contract maximizes XH subject to the borrower’s incentive compatibility
constraint and the break-even constraint of the creditor. The expected payog for the
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bank when the asset portfolio consists of the good asset is
D
¡
uK 
¡
g¯ g
¢
+ K
¡
g¯
¢¢
(13)
while the expected payog from holding bad assets is D
¡
uO 
¡
g¯ g
¢
+ O
¡
g¯
¢¢
, where
O
¡
g¯
¢
is the value of the put option on 1 dollar’s worth of the bank’s assets with strike
price g¯ when the bank holds bad assets. The incentive compatibility constraint is therefore
uK  uO  O
¡
g¯
¢
 K
¡
g¯
¢
= {
¡
g¯
¢
(IC)
where {
¡
g¯
¢
is deﬁned as O
¡
g¯
¢
K
¡
g¯
¢
. The term {
¡
g¯
¢
is analogous to the private
beneﬁt of exerting low egort in the moral hazard model of Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1997).
The bank trades og the greater option value of holding the riskier asset against the higher
expected payog from holding the good asset. The incentive compatibility constraint
requires that the option value be small relative to the digerence in expected returns.
Note that the IC constraint does not make reference to the market value of debt g,
but only to the face value of debt g¯. This reﬂects the fact that the IC constraint is a
condition on the strike price of the embedded option. In order to derive the market value
of debt (and hence market leverage), we must also use the IR constraint.
Given our assumptions on the densities governing the good and bad securities, we have
the following preliminary result.
Lemma 1 The incentive compatibility constraint always binds, and there is a unique
solution g¯W for the notional value of debt.
Proof. From the result in option pricing due to Breeden and Litzenberger (1978), the
price of the Arrow-Debreu contingent claim that pays 1 at } and zero otherwise is given
by the second derivative of the option price with respect to the strike price evaluated at
}. Since both the principal and agent are risk-neutral, the state price is the probability.
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Figure 8: Private beneﬁt in the moral hazard problem is the higher option value from limited liability
given by  (}) when default takes place at }.
Thus, we have
{ (}) =
Z }
0
(IO (v) IK (v)) gv
as illustrated in Figure 8. Since IK cuts IO precisely once from below, { (}) is increasing
initially, is maximized at the point }W where IK = IO, and is then decreasing. Using
integration by parts,10 we have
{ (1 + u¯) =
Z 1+u¯
0
(IO (v) IK (v)) gv
=
Z 1+u¯
0
(1 IK (v)) gv
Z 1+u¯
0
(1 IO (v)) gv
=
Z 1+u¯
0
viK (v) gv
Z 1+u¯
0
viO (v) gv
= uK  uO (14)
In other words, { (}) approaches uKuO from above as } $ 1+u¯. But from the notional
balance sheet (7), dividing all elements by D implies that 1 + u¯ A g¯. Thus, { (}) cuts
uK  uO precisely once, and there is a unique solution g¯W to the incentive compatibility
constraint (IC). This proves the lemma.
Lemma 1 gives the crucial leverage constraint for the bank arising from the haircut
implied by the collateral requirement set by the creditor. We will see shortly how the
10We are grateful to a referee for this proof.
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leverage constraint changes to shifts in the parameters characterizing the distribution over
outcomes.
3.4.1 Repo Interest Rate
The notional debt ratio g¯W that solves the bank’s incentive compability constraint. The
next step of the solution is to obtain the repo interest rate by using the break-even
constraint for the lender. The lender’s participation constraint (IR) is that the promised
interest payment g¯  g is just sucient to cover the value of the put option granted to
the borrower.
g = g¯ K
¡
g¯
¢
(15)
We can then solve for the market value of debt g. Denoting by gW the market value of
debt that solves the contracting problem, we have
gW = g¯W  K
¡
g¯W
¢
(16)
where g¯W is the unique solution to the borrower’s incentive compability constraint guaran-
teed by Lemma 1. The right hand side of (16) is the payog of a creditor with a notional
claim of g¯W. Hence, we can re-write (16) as
gW =
Z 1+u¯
0
min
©
g¯W> v
ª
iK (v) gv (17)
Clearly, gW is increasing in g¯W, so that the debt ratio in market values is increasing in the
notional debt ratio g¯W.
3.5 Balance Sheet Size
Having tied down the bank’s leverage through (16), the ﬁnal step of the solution is to
determine the scale of the bank’s balance sheet given its initial equity H. Note from (13)
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that the bank’s expected payog is:
XH (D)  D
¡
uK 
¡
g¯W  gW
¢
+ K
¡
g¯W
¢¢
(18)
The expression inside the brackets is strictly positive, since the bank extracts the full
surplus from the relationship. Hence, the bank’s payog is strictly increasing in D, and it
maximizes the scale of the bank subject only to initial equity and the leverage constraint
(16). Let W be the upper bound on leverage implied by gW, deﬁned as
W 
1
1 gW
(19)
Then, the bank chooses total balance sheet size given by:
D = WH (20)
We note the contrast between this feature of our model and the textbook discussion
that either treats the asset size as ﬁxed, or as evolving exogenously. Instead, in our
model, it is equity that is the exogenous variable. For given equity H, total asset size D
is determined as W×H, where W is the maximum leverage permitted by the creditors in
the contracting relationship. Thus, as W ﬂuctuates, so will the size of the bank’s balance
sheet. In the next section, we link W to the Value-at-Risk, and will see that the model
gives rise to the empirical features we documented in section 2.11
4 Value-at-Risk
We come to our core result. With the application to credit availability in mind, we
examine a family of payog distributions indexed by a parameter  that indicates the
stage of the business cycle. High  corresponds to boom times, while low  corresponds
11Haircuts determine the maximum level of leverage that ﬁnancial institutions can achieve. In the
static set-up of our paper, institutions will always lever maximally. In practice, institutions might not
lever maximally due to intertemporal considerations.
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to busts, and show how leverage and the probability of default varies with shifts in .
We now turn to the risk environment. Since bank failure and the probabilities
associated with Value-at-Risk are inherently concerned with extreme events, a general
framework where all such extreme outcomes can be accommodated would provide an
appropriate overall setting for our investigation.
The key result in our context is the Fisher-Tippett theorem from extreme value theory
(EVT) that plays the benchmark role for extreme outcomes in the way that the central
limit theorem plays for the limit of sums of i.i.d. random variables. The Fisher-Tippett
theorem states if the maximum draw from a sequence of i.i.d. realizations of a random
variable has a non-denerate limit, then any such limiting distribution belongs to the family
of Generalized Extreme Value (GEV) distributions.
Fisher-Tippett Theorem. Suppose [1> · · · > [q are i.i.d. with maximum realization
Pq. If there are (dq), (eq) such that
lim
q<"
Pr
µ
Pq  eq
dq
 }
¶
= J (})
for non-degenerate J (}), then
J (}) = exp
(

µ
1 + 
µ
}  

¶¶31)
(21)
for parameters >  5 R>  A 0 where 1 + 
¡
}3

¢
A 0
The version of the Fisher-Tippett theorem given above is due to Gnedenko (1948), and
is discussed in Embrechts, Kluppelberg and Mikosch (1997, chapter 3). The distribution
function (21) is the GEV distribution. Thus, under quite general conditions on the payog
distribution that are appropriate for extreme outcomes (such as the failure of ﬁnancial
intermediaries), the GEV distribution would be the appropriate parameterization of the
distributions IK and IO underlying our contracting problem. Thus, we parameterize IK
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Figure 9: Distribution functions IO and IK for  = 0=1,  = 0=5,  = 0=1, n = 0=05, and p = 1=4. The
dark line indicates IK and the lighter line indicates IO.
and IO as:
IK (}) = exp
n

¡
1 + 
¡
}3

¢¢3 1o > IO (}) = exp½³1 +  ³}3(3n)p ´´3 1¾ (22)
where n A 0 and p A 1. The location parameter  has the interpretation as the stage of
the business cycle with high  indicating booms and low  indicating busts. The outcome
distribution association with the choice of the bad action is shifted to the left by constant
n and has a scaling parameter 0 = p A . This formulation is consistent with our
assumption that the mean of IO is lower, and has greater dispersion p. Figure 9 plots
IK and IO for the parameters indicated. The main result of our paper can be stated as
follows.
Proposition 1 Suppose IK and IO are given by (22). Then, the solution to the con-
tracting problem entails probability of default  () that is invariant to .
The proposition states that the probability of default by the bank is invariant to
shifts in . In other words, the solution to the contracting problem entails the Value-
at-Risk rule, under which the bank’s leverage adjusts so as to leave the probability of
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Figure 10: Invariance of the probability of default . As the location parameter shifts from  to ˆ, the
bank’s leverage falls leaving default probability unchanged at .
default constant. Figure 10 illustrates the key invariance property of default over the
cycle, where the probability of default does not depend on . In Figure 10, as the
location parameter shifts from  to ˆ, the bank’s leverage falls leaving default probability
unchanged at , even though the underlying distribution functions have shifted.
Steps in the proof of the Proposition are given in the appendix, but we give the key
steps here. In the appendix, we show that the temptation payog { at  can be written
as
{
¡
g¯W ()
¢
=  ×
ln(1@())Z
p
1
 ((ln(1@()))3+ n )
3 1
w3(1+)h3wgw (23)
where  () is the probability of default by the bank in the contracting outcome at .
Next, the mean of the GEV distribution has the form +K () where K () is a function
solely of .12 Hence
uK () uO () =  + K () (  n)pK ()
= n  (p 1)K () (24)
12See the wikipedia page http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Generalized extreme value distribution
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which is invariant to . Then the IC constraint deﬁnes an equation for the probability
of default  that is invariant to , given by
constant =
ln(1@())Z
p
1
 ((ln(1@()))3+ n )
3 1
w3(1+)h3wgw (25)
Thus, the location parameter  enters the solution solely through the probability of default
. Since (25) deﬁnes  implicitly, the probability of default is invariant to . This proves
Proposition 1.
4.1 Closed Form Solution
The probability of default  in the VaR rule is determined by the fundamentals of the
contracting problem, and in some cases, we can obtain an explicit solution for . One
such case is when  = 1 and p$ 1. Then, we have
IK (}) = exp
½
}  

 1
¾
> IO (}) = exp
½
}  (  n)

 1
¾
(26)
and we have IO (}; ) @IK (}; ) = h
n
 A 1. The temptation payog can be written as
{ (}; ) =
Z }
3"
(IO (v; ) IK (v; )) gv
=
³
h
n
  1
´Z }
3"
IK (v; ) gv
=
³
h
n
  1
´
· IK (}; ) (27)
From the IC constraint {
¡
g¯W; 
¢
= uK  uO so that³
h
n
  1
´
· IK
¡
g¯W; 
¢
= uK  uO (28)
From (27) and (28), the probability of default  () is given by
 () = IK
¡
g¯W; 
¢
=
uK  uO

³
h
n
  1
´ (29)
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which is invariant to . What’s more, we can solve for  so that we can fully endogenize
the Value-at-Risk conﬁdence level f = 1   in terms of parameters of moral hazard
problem. Together with the deﬁnition of  () as the probability of default,
 () = IK
¡
g¯W; 
¢
= exp
½
g¯W  

 1
¾
=
uK  uO

³
h
n
  1
´ (30)
We thus have an explicit solution for the probability of default . We can also solve
explicitly for the debt ratio g¯W
g¯W =  +  +  ln
µ
uK  uO
 (hn@  1)
¶
(31)
We see that g¯W is increasing in , so that leverage increases in boom times and decreases
in busts. Leverage is procyclical.
As a cross check, we can verify that our closed form solution can be obtained from the
general solution given by (25). Note that when  = 1, we have
uK  uO

=
ln(1@)Z
p31(ln(1@)3 n )
h3wgw
=

h3w
¸ln(1@)
p31(ln(1@)3 n )
= 
³
(h)3
p31
p h
n
p  1
´
(32)
Then for p $ 1, we have (uK  uO) @ = 
³
h
n
  1
´
so that  has the closed-form
solution given by (30). We can thus fully endogenize the conﬁdence level of the Value-
at-Risk constraint through the underlying moral hazard problem.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have employed perhaps the simplest contracting model for the determi-
nation of leverage and balance sheet size for ﬁnancial intermediaries, and have examined
the conditions under which the Value-at-Risk rule emerges from the contracting outcome.
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Our framework provides one possible microeconomic foundation for the widespread use of
the Value-at-Risk rule among ﬁnancial institutions. Our setup sheds light on the extent
to which leverage decisions are the constraints that creditors impose on debtors.
The procyclical nature of leverage is a feature that is potentially at odds with many
standard portfolio decision rules. For instance, for an investor with log utility, the leverage
of the investor is monotonic in the Sharpe ratio of the risky security, so that leverage is
high when the risk premium is high (Merton (1969)). In other words, for investors
with log utility, leverage is countercyclical. Xiong (2001), He and Krishnamurthy (2013)
and Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2011) are recent contributions that use the log utility
formulation and hence which have the feature that leverage is countercyclical.
We have discussed the digerence between the notion of leverage deﬁned in terms of the
total assets of the bank and in terms of its enterprise value. Which of the two notions of
leverage is relevant depends on the context and the question being addressed. Enterprise
value has to do with how much the bank is worth, while assets have to do with how much
the bank lends. We have argued that for questions to do with the supply of credit by
banks, total assets and book leverage are key. Financial stability questions that deal with
runs on banks by other banks are also about lending, in this case by one bank to another
bank. Hence, again, book leverage is the key notion. The digerences between behavior
implied by the VaR rule and log preferences matter for those macro applications that
focus on the availability of credit. The supply of credit by banks is about the portfolio of
the banks - i.e. its book asset, rather than its enterprise value, and so procyclical leverage
has a direct impact on the supply of credit through shrinking lending. Nun˜o and Thomas
(2011) and Adrian and Boyarchenko (2012) are examples of macroeconomic models with
ﬁnancial sectors that replicates the procyclicality of leverage.
Our modeling framework provides microfoundations to the limits of arbitrage and the
ﬁre sale literatures. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) provide an early model of ﬁre sales, where
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equilibrium asset values depend on the debt capacity of the sector of the economy that
invests in such assets. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) point out that the ﬁnancial constraints
of ﬁnancial intermediaries agect equilibrium asset valuations. More recently, many stud-
ies have either implicitly or explicitly assumed a Value-at-Risk constraint in modeling the
management of ﬁnancial institutions. Our paper contributes to this literature by pro-
viding microfoundations for the pervasive use of Value-at-Risk type rules. Gromb and
Vayanos (2002) construct a model of intermediary capital, where constraints on the inter-
mediary can induce excessive risk taking, as intermediaries are not internalizing that their
ﬁre sales tighten margin constraints of other arbitrageurs. Gromb and Vayanos (2010)
provide conditions when the presence of intermediaries stabilize or destabilize equilibrium
asset prices. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) introduce margin constraints that follow
a Value-at-Risk rule, and stress the interaction of market and funding liquidity. Oehmke
(2008 and 2009) studies the speed and the spreading of price deviations when arbitrageurs
face Value-at-Risk or other risk management constraints.
To be sure, showing that the VaR rule is the outcome of a contracting model says
little about the desirability of the widespread adoption of such practices from the point
of view of macroeconomic eciency. Indeed, risk management tools such as Value-at-
Risk that solve bilateral incentive frictions can generate spillover egects across ﬁnancial
institutions. The leveraging and deleveraging cycle and associated ﬂuctuations in market
risk premiums are likely to be inﬂuenced by the widespread adoption of risk management
rules (Shin (2010)).
In a system context, ﬂuctuations in leverage have far-reaching egects. To the extent
that the ﬁnancial system as a whole holds long-term, illiquid assets ﬁnanced by short-term
liabilities, any tensions resulting from a sharp increase in risk will show up somewhere
in the system. Even if some institutions can adjust down their balance sheets ﬂexibly
in response to the greater stress, there will be some pinch points in the system that will
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be exposed by the distressed conditions. In egect, a generalized fall in the permitted
leverage in the ﬁnancial system can lead to a “run” on a particular institution that has
funded long-lived illiquid assets by borrowing short. Developments of our techniques may
be useful in richer setting with more complex intermediation relationships.
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A Appendix
In this appendix, we provide the steps in the proof of Proposition 1. Consider the
Generalized Extreme Value (GEV) distribution given by
J (}) = exp
(

µ
1 + 
µ
}  

¶¶3 1)
We would like the expression for the integral of the GEV distribution. As a ﬁrst step,
consider the incomplete gamma function K ({> |) deﬁned as
K ({> |) 
Z "
|
w{31h3wgw
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Hence the indeﬁnite integral of J (}) is:
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¢¢3 1o g} = K ({> |) + constant
Deﬁne | (}> > 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µ
}  

¶¶31
Let  be the probability of default for the bank. Then
 = exp
½

³
1 + 
³
g¯W3

´´31¾
= h3|(g¯
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so that |
¡
g¯W> > 
¢
=  ln = ln (1@). Now, consider the expression for the temptation
payog for the bad action in the moral hazard problem for the bank. The temptation
payog to risk-shifting is the additional option value given by the bad action O. The
option values of O and K are given, respectively, byZ g¯W
0
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where p A 1 and n A 0. The temptation payog in the moral hazard problem is given by
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Meanwhile, we know that |
¡
g¯W> > 
¢
= ln (1@). Also, by re-arranging the expression:
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we have
|
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Therefore, from (34), we have
{ () =  ×
ln(1@)Z
p
1
 ((ln(1@))3+ n )
3 1
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We see from (35) that the temptation payog { () is a function of  solely through its
egect on the probability of default .
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